Employer Failure to Inquire After Hypomanic Resignation = Discrimination

layoffs in alberta employment law concerns.

In Volpi v Lifemark Health Corp, 2026 AHRC 26, the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal found that an employer had discriminated against one of its employees by accepting the employee’s resignation without inquiring into the same, notwithstanding that the employer knew, or ought to have known, that the resignation was connected to the employee’s mental disability.

The parties had established a past practice of the employee taking time off when needed to deal with his disability, but the employer failed to communicate the relevant information internally when a new supervisor took over responsibility for the employee in 2015.

The employee requested time off to deal with his disability in the summer of 2016, which the employer denied without inquiring further as to whether the request was connected to the employee’s disability. The delay resulted in further deterioration of the employee’s mental health and contributed to him to entering into a hypomanic state and suddenly resigning from his employment. The result was the sudden end of what had been a lucrative 16-year working relationship between the parties.

The decision confirms that the duty to inquire can apply to situations other than performance management or discipline and reminds employers to implement robust processes for gathering, retaining, and communicating disability- and accommodation-related information internally. Here, the employer’s failure to adequately communicate relevant information to the relevant individuals prevented the employer from fulfilling its human rights obligations to the employee and resulted in a finding of discrimination under the Alberta Human Rights Act.

The Volpi decision itself is fairly long.  I have distilled it down considerably in this summary.

Facts

The key facts are as follows:

  • Volpi worked as a physiotherapist for Lifemark at its Village Square Sport Physiotherapy clinic for approximately 16 years (“Lifemark”).
  • Volpi has diagnosed mental disabilities, including Bipolar II Disorder.
  • Singh became clinic director in 2015 and immediately dealt with a number of issues relating to Volpi that required changes in the workplace which were valid and justified and not connected to Volpi’s disability, but which caused stressed for Volpi.
  • During the 2015-2016 period, Volpi had regular meetings with Singh and ahis predecessor, K. Head, regarding the aforementioned workplace issues. During the meetings, Singh observed and commented that Volpi was experiencing stress.
  • Volpi’s mental health continued to deteriorate. He asked for time off to deal with his mental health and avoid a full relapse – an approach which had worked for him in the past.
  • Volpi asked Singh for time off in December 2015 – January 2016 and disclosed to Singh that the request was related to his mental health. Singh granted the request.
  • Volpi continued to struggle with his mental health. In June 2016, he told Singh that something was wrong and requested more time off to deal with his mental health.
  • Singh approved a week off for Volpi in the beginning of July 2016. Volpi visited his family physician, who referred him to a psychiatrist.
  • Volpi returned from his week off in July and was not feeling better. He advised Singh that he needed a longer period of time off to deal with his mental health.
  • Singh advised Volpi that he could not take time off in the summer because of the vacation schedules of others that were already in place. Singh also advised that he needed a reason to approve that much time off. He pushed Volpi to agree not to take time off until the beginning of October 2016.
  • During the discussions, Volpi indicated that he was struggling with stress and burnout. He raised the possibility of providing a medical note. Singh did not provide anyone else at Lifemark with any of this information. At no time did Singh or anyone else ask if the request for leave was required for mental health purposes.
  • Volpi continued to work because Lifemark did not approve his leave. His mental health continued to deteriorate throughout the summer and into September 2016.
  • On September 30, 2016, the day before he was scheduled to begin his approved leave, Volpi suddenly submitted a hastily typed resignation letter to Singh, who did not ask if the resignation had anything to do with Volpi’s mental health issues or make any other inquiries of any kind before accepting the resignation.
  • Volpi was in a hypomanic state (a symptom of Bipolar II Disorder) when he made the rash decision to print a curt and rushed resignation letter and provide it to Singh purporting to end his 16-year relationship the day before he was scheduled to go on leave to deal with his mental health issues.
  • Volpi later emailed Lifemark and again talked about “burnout” and the “complex” reasons for him leaving. Lifemark did not respond, did not reassess whether the resignation should be accepted, and made no inquiries into the reasons for Volpi’s actions or into his mental health status.
  • Volpi later made inquiries about returning to work for Lifemark and advised that he had been hospitalized following his resignation. Lifemark told him he could reapply, but he did not do so. Lifemark did not make any inquiries about his mental health or reasons for resignation, nor did it offer to rescind its acceptance of his resignation or to reemploy him.
  • Following the hypomanic state that Volpi was in in the Fall of 2016 and the decisions he made during that time, Volpi entered into a state of escalating depression which ultimately led to his hospitalization in March 2017.
  • Volpi filed a human rights complaint alleging that Lifemark discriminated against him in the area of employment practices on the ground of mental disability contrary to section 7 of the Alberta Human Rights Act.
  • The Tribunal eventually heard the complaint and concluded the following:
    • Lifemark did not discriminate against Volpi with respect to his allegations relating to harassment, diverting patients, or a toxic workplace environment.
    • Lifemark discriminated against Volpi by delaying his ability to take time off and by accepting his resignation without inquiring into whether his leave request and resignation were related to his mental disability and without any real consideration of whether it could accommodate Volpi.
  • The Tribunal had bifurcated the complaint and will reconvene in May 2026 to hear evidence and argument regarding remedy in light of the above findings.

 

Analysis / Conclusion

Evidence and Credibility

The factual circumstances of the complaint were complex. The Tribunal acknowledged that:

[T]his case comes down to a specific factual and contextual assessment of what the manifestations of the complainant’s mental health issues were, what the respondent knew or ought to have known about those mental health issues and their manifestations, and how that was or was not connected to the complaint’s and respondent’s conduct.

The Tribunal heard evidence from five witnesses: Volpi, Singh, Dr. Westaway, Dr. Sargeant, and Dr. Zare-Bawani. Lifemark initially intended to call Mr. Head, the clinic director who preceded Singh, but ultimately decided not to. Lifemark did not provide any reason for the change.

Discrepancies in the evidence and the parties’ respective positions caused credibility to be an important issue. The Tribunal conducted its credibility assessment pursuant to the approach it had previously followed in Mitchell v Edmonton Public School Board, noting the following factors to be considered:

  1. The internal consistency or inconsistency of evidence;
  2. The witness’s ability and/or capacity to apprehend and recollect;
  3. The witness’s opportunity and/or inclination to tailor evidence;
  4. The witness’s opportunity and/or inclination to embellish evidence;
  5. The existence of corroborative and/or confirmatory evidence;
  6. The motive of the witnesses and/or their relationship with the parties; and
  7. The failure to call or produce material evidence.

The Tribunal drew an adverse inference from Lifemark’s failure to call Mr. Head as a witness. Specifically, the Tribunal accepted Volpi’s evidence that he had previously disclosed his mental health issues to Mr. Head, including those which resulted in his hospitalization in 2009. Because of the disclosure, Lifemark knew or ought to have known about Volpi’s disability and past practice of requesting and being granted time off to deal with his mental health issues.

 

Discrimination

The Tribunal applied the test described in Moore v British Columbia (Education) to determine whether Volpi had established prima facie discrimination on the balance of probabilities:

  1. Does the complainant have a protected characteristic?
  2. Did the complainant suffer an adverse impact?
  3. Was the protected characteristic a factor in the adverse impact?

The parties agreed that Volpi has a mental disability, so the first part of the test was not at issue.

 

Discrimination Regarding Requests for Time Off

The parties disagreed regarding how to characterize Lifemark’s response to Volpi’s request for time off in July 2016. Volpi argued that Lifemark had denied his request while Lifemark argued that it had approved the request on a mutually agreed upon date. After reviewing the evidence, the Tribunal concluded that while Volpi had expressed “agreement” to the dates, Lifemark had left him with no other choice.

Volpi’s inability to take time off when requested was an adverse impact, fulfilling the second part of the prima facie test for discrimination.

Through Head, Lifemark knew that Volpi had a history of serious mental health issues to the point of being hospitalized. Lifemark also knew that Volpi had a history of asking for time off for his mental health issues, with said requests being accommodated previously. Volpi’s inability to take time off when requested was clearly connected to his protected characteristic.

The Tribunal acknowledged that Volpi had obligations to bring accommodation requests forward and cooperate with the accommodation process but stressed that it was not up to Volpi to ensure that Lifemark had adequate processes in place to gather, retain, and share the disability- and accommodation-related information. Lifemark had failed to provide evidence regarding the specifics of any such processes.

Lifemark’s knowledge of Volpi’s disability and that he was taking time off to deal with his disability was sufficient to establish the third step of the test for prima facie discrimination.

 

Duty to Inquire Regarding Request for Time Off

Employers have a duty to inquire when they know or ought to know that there is a nexus between an employee’s actions and a disability. The duty to inquire operates as an exception to the general principle that employees have a duty to disclose relevant information and request accommodation before any human rights obligations are imposed on the employer.

The Tribunal concluded that Singh knew or ought to have known that Volpi’s disability was a reason for his request for time off. The following factual findings led the Tribunal to such a conclusion:

  1. Volpi was experiencing and exhibiting signs of stress and burnout;
  2. Volpi had just returned from one week off and immediately asked for another lengthier period of time off;
  3. Volpi had told Singh that Volpi had dealt with Head for similar requests in the past;
  4. Singh had been in meetings with Head and Volpi where Head had referenced Volpi’s dealings with stress; and
  5. Volpi had raised the possibility of obtaining a medical note to support his leave.

The offer to obtain a medical note “tipped the balance” to indicate that Singh should have known that the request for time off was connected to Volpi’s disability.

Respecting medical notes generally, the Tribunal commented that there is no independent obligation for an employee to provide medical documents if they are not requested or otherwise expected, especially where the employer’s past practice has not been to request or require such a note.

Even if Lifemark had not actually known that the leave request was related to Volpi’s disability, it reasonably ought to have known it was and so had a duty to inquire as to whether that was the case. Having failed to inquire, the third step of the test for prima facie discrimination was made out.

 

Discrimination Regarding the Resignation and Subsequent Events

The Tribunal distinguished the present case from Cliff v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta (Human Services), where it had determined that an employee’s resignation was not an adverse impact. In Cliff, the employee did not have any medical restriction at the time of resignation. Here, Volpi was suffering from a medically confirmed mental disability at the time he resigned.

Further, Lifemark’s actions prior to the resignation (delaying the start of his leave) were an adverse impact which lead, or at least contributed to, the end of the employment relationship. Volpi had adduced expert evidence confirming that the delay had contributed to Volpi’s declining mental state, which his hypomanic resignation was a symptom of.  The end of the relationship was an adverse impact, fulfilling the second part of the prima facie test for discrimination.

 

Duty to Inquire Into the Resignation

The Tribunal applied the duty to inquire framework to Volpi’s resignation, first noting that the medical and expert evidence clearly established that Volpi’s resignation was a symptom of his mental disability. The Tribunal noted the following factors which indicated that Lifemark knew or ought to have known that Volpi’s disability was a reason for the resignation:

  1. Volpi was exhibiting signs of stress and burnout;
  2. Volpi had asked for a significant amount of time off;
  3. Lifemark had approved some time off, but at a significantly later date;
  4. Volpi was set to begin that time off the day following his resignation;
  5. Rather than go on leave as planned, Volpi hastily submitted a two-line resignation letter with a spelling mistake;
  6. If accepted, the resignation would end a 16-year employment relationship;
  7. Singh was “shocked” by the resignation letter;
  8. Others within Lifemark knew of Volpi’s mental health history;
  9. After submitting his resignation, Volpi continued to see patients until the end of his shift, had patients booked following his leave, and did not take any of his personal belongings.

The Tribunal found that Lifemark should have paused prior to accepting the resignation to make real inquiries as to Volpi’s mental state. It failed to do so. Lifemark also failed to make inquiries after Volpi emailed it on October 8, 2016, again referencing “burnout”, and when it learned that Volpi had been hospitalized in March 2017. The failure to inquire fulfilled the third part of the prima facie discrimination test regarding the resignation.

 

Failure to Inquire Prevented Employer from Accommodating the Employee

Lifemark failed to establish a defense to the prima facie finding of discrimination, with the Tribunal concluding that Lifemark’s failure to inquire had prevented it from ever properly turning its mind to accommodating Volpi’s disability to the point of undue hardship. In relation to Lifemark’s failure to inquire into and accommodate Volpi’s disability, the Tribunal grimly concluded:

because the respondent failed in meeting its duty to inquire, we will never know what might have occurred at these junctures had it met its obligation in that regard.

 

The Tribunal in Volpi did not consider what damages were owed by Lifemark to Volpi for its discriminatory actions, noting that the parties would hear evidence and argument on that issue separately.

 

My Take

While the decision is a clear win for employees, employers do not need to clutch their pearls just yet.

The Tribunal was careful to emphasize how it reached its conclusions based on the unique facts before it. A different context may very well have yielded different results. Of particular importance was the undisputed evidence that the employee had diagnosed mental disabilities, including Bipolar II Disorder, which had caused his hospitalization in 2009, and which he had previously disclosed to the employer.

However, the decision is in some ways a symptom of the employer’s own internal communication failures and failure to implement sufficient processes to accommodate its employees’ mental health needs.

The decision expands on the duty to inquire, a doctrine typically arising in the context of performance concerns or discipline, by applying it to the context of an employee’s resignation and request for time off. In doing so, the decision confirms that the duty to inquire can be adapted as necessary to apply in the context of adverse impacts other than performance management or discipline.

The common law already requires employers to approach employee resignations with caution. The Volpi decision serves as a further reminder for employers to be mindful as to whether a sudden or unusual resignation may be connected to a disability. That said, the Tribunal confirmed that “Whether the duty to inquire engages in a particular case is entirely fact dependent”. Not every resignation or request for time off will trigger the duty to inquire, and different scenarios may lead to different results.

The decision serves as a reminder for employers to have sufficient processes in place to gather, retain, and communicate disability- and accommodation-related information internally. Such processes are necessary for employers to address complex situations involving their duties to inquire and accommodate.

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