In Dunlop v Carpenters’ Regional Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 2026 ABCA 88, the Court dismissed the appeal of four union members seeking injunctive relief after the Union refused to dismiss disciplinary charges the members had argued were filed outside of the union’s limitation period. The ABCA interpreted section 152(1)(b) of the Labor Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1 (“Code”), finding that the Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes of internal union discipline applied in a “discriminatory” manner.
Dunlop directs a broad interpretation of the Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction over both the interpretation of union constitutions and internal union discipline. The ABCA clarifies that a union’s potential breach of its own constitution can fall within the purview of section 152, increasing the difficulty for union members in Alberta to seek relief from the courts.
Facts
The following is a summary of the key facts:
- The appellant employees were members of the respondent union and trustees of union-established pension and health and wellness trusts.
- The union received a complaint that the appellants made unauthorized changes to trust agreements and misappropriated funds. Disciplinary charges were filed against them.
- The union’s constitution contained a mandatory limitation period requiring the Executive Committee to dismiss any charge filed more than six months after the date the violation occurred or reasonably should have been discovered.
- The employees advised the union that the charges were filed well beyond the six-month limitation period and demanded they be summarily dismissed.
- The union refused, taking the position that the alleged breaches were of a continuing nature and subject to ongoing litigation, and that the six-month period did not apply.
- The employees applied to the Court of King’s Bench for urgent injunctive and declaratory relief to stop the disciplinary trial from proceeding. After the chambers judge dismissed the application, the employees then made a complaint to the Board under section 152(1)(b), alleging that the union engaged in unfair labor practice by refusing to dismiss the charges for being out of time.
- The employees appealed to the decision of the Court of King’s Bench not to grant injunctive and declaratory relief.
Analysis/Conclusion
The ABCA applied the Weber/Regina Police framework, which holds that determining jurisdiction requires (i) identifying the “essential character” of the dispute, and (ii) interpreting the relevant Code provisions over which the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate. The central question was whether the chambers judge correctly characterized the dispute as falling within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction under s 152(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Code, which provides:
No trade union or person acting on behalf of a trade union shall … (b) take disciplinary action against or impose any form of penalty on a person by applying to the person in a discriminatory manner the standards of discipline of the trade union
The appellant employees argued their dispute was about the “correct interpretation of a union’s constitution,” placing it outside the Board’s statutory jurisdiction. The union took the opposite position, arguing the essential character was whether disciplinary action taken in breach of the union’s constitution constitutes discriminatory conduct under s 152(1)(b). The union relied on Philip v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers, 2008 ABQB 742, affirmed 2009 ABCA 400 which defined “discriminatory” as treating individuals or groups on grounds that are illegal, arbitrary, or unreasonable, and held that actions taken in breach of a union’s own rules, procedures, bylaws, or constitution are discriminatory.
The Court confirmed that the essential character of the dispute was whether the union applied its disciplinary standards discriminatorily by refusing to enforce its own constitutional limitation period. The employees also argued that s 152(1)(b) could not apply because no sanctions had yet been imposed, and that the court retained jurisdiction to grant interim relief in the meantime. The Court rejected this, finding that s 152(1)(b) expressly distinguishes between “disciplinary action” and the imposition of a “penalty.” The proceedings leading up to a disciplinary trial constitute disciplinary action in their own right, and accepting the employees’ interpretation would render those words redundant.
The Court also rejected the argument that disputes about a union’s constitution belong in court. A narrow reading of the Board’s jurisdiction would increase the risk of a single dispute fragmenting between two forums, generating delay and complexity that the Code‘s remedial purpose is designed to prevent.
My Take
The Supreme Court of Canada in Berry v Pulley, 2002 SCC 40, established that the relationship between a union and its members is contractual, with the union’s constitution forming the foundation of that contract, giving members a right of action in the courts for breach. However, Dunlop directsthat this right is effectively abrogated in Alberta wherever s 152(1)(b) applies. . My reading of the direction in Dunlop is that this will happen most of the time.
The Court’s interpretation contains notable internal tension. On the one hand, the Court states that not every breach of a union’s constitution will be discriminatory (para 29). On the other, it holds that differential treatment is always established when a union disciplines a member in breach of its constitution, because the union necessarily treats that member differently from others who will face constitutionally compliant discipline in the future. It is difficult to reconcile those two propositions. If a breach of the constitution always establishes differential treatment, it is hard to conceive of a constitutional breach that would not engage s 152(1)(b).
There is no express statutory provision granting the Board exclusive jurisdiction to interpret a union’s constitution. Effectively, Dunlop seems to read all future disputes involving the interpretation of constitutional provisions into section 152(1)(b), distinguishing federal and other provincial jurisprudence based on Alberta’s legislative scheme and affirming the Board’s specialized expertise in interpreting constitutional provisions.
The appellants’ own litigation strategy may have influenced the outcome, at least to some extent. After the chambers judge dismissed their interlocutory application, the appellants filed a complaint with the Board under s. 152, alleging unfair labour practice, while simultaneously appealing the chambers decision to the Court of Appeal. Given the 90-day limitation period under the Code, that was an understandable tactical choice. However, it made it easier for the Court to conclude that the essential character of the dispute fell under s 152. One could ask whether the result would have been the same had the appellants waited for the disciplinary decision and then brought a court action for breach of contract, arguing that the issue was one of contractual interpretation and breach, with no available forum before the Board. That argument was not squarely before the Court on these facts.
For unions, Dunlop is a strong decision. Unions have long had strong arguments for ousting court jurisdiction whenever a unionized member brings an action against them, whether under the Code or at common law. Dunlop gives unions yet another avenue to advance that argument, reinforcing that internal discipline disputes, even those framed as constitutional interpretation questions, belong before the Board.
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