In Dr Ignacio Tan III v Alberta Veterinary Medical Association, 2026 ABCA 176, a veterinarian lost his appeal on four findings of unprofessional conduct and all sanctions, yet still walked away with relief.
He was sanctioned for handed a grieving family a stranger’s ashes in place of their cat. There were also sanctions related to sedations of the animal his record keeping. The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld all these findings.
What did not hold up were the costs. While Dr. Tan was litigating, the law of costs in Alberta discipline cases shifted beneath the regulator, and the Court sent the costs orders back for reconsideration. That shift reaches well beyond veterinary medicine and affects all professional regulation in Alberta.
Facts
- Tan was the responsible registered veterinarian at Mercy Animal Hospital (“MAH”) at the relevant time.
- Clients brought their cat to MAH; Dr. Tan sedated it, performed a procedure to remove a urethral obstruction, and sent it home the same day.
- The cat was re-admitted two days later and passed away.
- The clients had asked for an individual cremation, but the cat was cremated communally, and an MAH employee handed them communal cremains on the pretense that it was their cat.
- The clients confirmed the truth with the crematorium, could not get a satisfactory explanation from Dr. Tan, and filed a complaint with the Alberta Veterinary Medical Association (the “Tribunal”).
- The Tribunal found Dr. Tan guilty of four instances of unprofessional conduct, covering his oversight of staff, his communication with the clients, the missing anesthetist, and his medical records.
- The Tribunal imposed a reprimand, a 60-day suspension, continuing education, a communication course, up to $42,500 in hearing costs, and publication on a “with names” basis.
- He appealed to the Committee of Council.
- The Committee of Council upheld the merits and sanctions, and separately ordered Dr. Tan to pay the total cost of the internal appeal (this is called full indemnity costs).
- Tan appealed almost the entire result to the Court of Appeal.
Analysis / Conclusion
The appeal reached the Court of Appeal under section 45.1 of the Veterinary Profession Act. The misconduct findings were always going to be hard to dislodge. Findings of fact are reviewed for palpable and overriding error, per Housen v Nikolaisen, a deferential standard that largely explains why the misconduct grounds failed. Costs in professional disciplinary matters are reviewed for reasonableness.
On the first finding, the Court agreed that Dr. Tan failed to provide adequate guidance and oversight of his staff. Aware of the cremains allegations, he simply told a non-veterinarian employee to investigate, without supervising that work or ensuring the clients were told the truth. He argued that, with only one of three particularized claims proven, the allegation had to fail. The Court disagreed. Drawing on cases such as Visconti, MacLeod, and Alsaadi, it confirmed the amended notice gave adequate notice of the case to meet, and nothing required all three particulars to be proven. A finding can rest on some particulars and not others.
The second finding, that Dr. Tan failed to communicate with the clients, also stood. They could reach him only by using a fake name, and he had staff screen calls to avoid them. He argued this finding duplicated the oversight finding and should be stayed under the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions on the same facts. That principle can apply in professional discipline, as Danyluik confirms, but the Court found the two findings distinct. One concerned his oversight of staff, the other his own failure to respond when the clients sought him directly. The argument had not been raised below in any event.
The third finding concerned the dedicated anesthetist. Dr. Tan sedated the cat with dexmedetomidine, ketamine, and butorphanol, with no anesthetist present. The bylaw requires a separate anesthetist for patients under “general anesthesia and or prolonged and/or deep sedation,” and the Tribunal found this was “deep sedation.” Dr. Tan argued the bylaw defines “sedation” but not “deep sedation,” so the Tribunal applied the wrong definition. The Court found it had considered all relevant definitions, and that he led no evidence his drugs fell short of deep sedation.
The fourth finding, on medical records, was the same. While not every imperfection is unprofessional conduct, the Tribunal found deficiencies and gaps amounting to a substantial departure from the standard, with ample evidence to support it.
On sanctions, the Tribunal applied the well-known factors from Jaswal v Medical Board (Nfld), which the Court confirmed still guide regulators on sanction. Dr. Tan did not show the sanctions were unreasonable, and that ground was dismissed too.
Costs were the one place Dr. Tan prevailed, and he did so for a reason that had nothing to do with the merits. Both costs orders, 50 percent of the hearing costs and full indemnity on the internal appeal, had rested on the framework from Jinnah v Alberta Dental Association and College, 2022 ABCA 336. After Jinnah, the Alberta Court of Appeal revised the law of costs in professional discipline in Charkhandeh v College of Dental Surgeons of Alberta, 2025 ABCA 258. Charkhandeh directed that the Jinnah approach should no longer be used. It is understood to have moved away from presumptions and percentage awards toward a statute-grounded approach, with closer attention to the reasonableness of the expenses and the proportionality of the award.
Because both costs awards relied on the displaced Jinnah framework, the Court remitted the costs issue to the Council for reconsideration under Charkhandeh. It followed its own recent decision in Dr Ignacio Tan III v Alberta Veterinary Medical Association, 2026 ABCA 32. It noted the Council had the option to send the matter back to the Tribunal for further evidence if necessary, since recalculating costs the Charkhandeh way may call for line-item evidence the original record does not contain.
My Take
The misconduct and sanctions results seem consistent with the bulk of the appellate authority. Where findings rest on the evidence and the weighing a tribunal is best placed to do, an appeal court reviewing for palpable and overriding error has little room to intervene. The Court worked through his arguments and found them unpersuasive.
The costs portion is the part that matters most for professional regulators and regulated members. Charkhandeh is already affecting outcomes. Here, a member lost comprehensively on the merits and sanctions for unprofessional conduct but still won relief on costs, because the orders rested on a framework the Court has since set aside. This is not the first time the Court has recently remitted a costs order on that basis. Any college or association still defending a Jinnah-based costs order on appeal should expect real scrutiny. A percentage award made without a careful look at the reasonableness of the expenses is now at risk of being overturned.
The practical takeaway is about process. On my reading, a tribunal that wants its costs award to hold up will need to set out its reasoning and show why the costs it shifts to the member are reasonable, not just apply a flat percentage. There is room to argue how far Charkhandeh reaches outside the Health Professions Act context in which it was decided, but a costs award that engages those questions on its face is, in the current law, far more durable than one that does not.
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