In Burns v Samsara Technologies Canada ULC, 2026 AHRC 108 (Oshionebo), the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal found that a complaint filed 1 year and 5 days after a termination notice was provided was time-barred.
This case is important because it illustrates the strict, and arguably harsh, application of human rights limitations dates.
Facts
The following were the pertinent facts summarized by the AHRT:
- The complainant employee Mr. Burns worked for Samsara
- He went on stress leave in 2023
- Upon the death of his father-in-law, he requested bereavement leave to commence May 1, 2024
- Soon after this request, he was provided notice on April 25, 2024 that his employment was ending May 1, 2024
- On April 30, 2025, Mr. Burns filed an AB Human Rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of mental disability and family status
- The AB Human Rights Director dismissed the claim for being filed more than 1 year past the date of alleged discrimination
- He filed a request for review of that dismissal decision with the Tribunal (that request for review is the one summarized here).
Analysis / Conclusion
This summarized decision was entirely about whether the complainant had filed his human rights complaint within 1 year of the discriminatory act(s).
The complainant argued the 1 year limitation commenced on May 1, 2024, when his employment was actually terminated by Samsara, which is also the date he experienced the denial of bereavement leave.
The Tribunal held that the operative limitation date was the date the discrimination occurred, not the date of the effects of discrimination.
The Tribunal found that if discrimination were present in this case, the relevant date for limitations analysis was April 25, 2024, the date he received his termination notice. The effects were not felt until termination occurred on May 1, 2024, but this did not change the relevant date for the limitations date analysis.
Since he filed on April 30, 2024, he had filed more than 1 year after the discrimination occurred and the claim was statute-barred by limitations and could not be extended. The key reasoning was as follows:
[22] […] the Complaint was filed soon after the expiry of the one-year limitation period. However, the limitation periods under the Act are strict and permit no discretion on the part of this Tribunal.[12] The Tribunal stated in Cromie v Industrial Paramedic Services Ltd. and Tourmaline Oil Corp,[13] that the limitation period in section 20(2)(b) “is mandatory, and neither the Director nor the tribunal has the power to waive its application.” […]
As a result, the Director’s decision to dismiss the complaint was upheld. The Tribunal dismissed his complaint.
My Take
The result in this case will seem very harsh to many observers.
Those observers include me. To me, the reasoning in this decision could lead to something akin to free-reign discrimination for clever employers. I anticipate the following potential wrinkles in future cases following this one:
- Employers might start telling their employees shortly after hiring that they intend to discriminate against them in the future with respect to any known applicable protected grounds. That way, when the problematic actions themselves occur, the employers can argue these are just “effects” of the original discriminatory act and are barred by limitations.
- Even employers not employing the above tactic might start keeping track of the first discriminatory event that does occur, so they can terminate employment just over 1 year from that Burns v Samsara could be read to treat intervening discriminatory events and the termination itself as mere “effects” of the first event, which should not trigger fresh limitations. If accepted, this would prevent a large number of otherwise valid human rights claims.
- Employers might start giving employees 16 months (for instance) notice of a discriminatory termination. Based on the reasoning in Burns v Samsara, these employees would be required to sue their employers for discriminatory termination prior to their actual dismissal. Many claims would fail here as well.
I’ll also note that several longstanding authorities have interpreted human rights limitations in a way that I would respectfully suggest are inconsistent with Burns v Samsara. There are several cases, for instance, where events occurring more than 1 year prior to filing have been used for necessary context to establish that subsequent events within 1 year were, in fact, discriminatory. Several other cases have treated limitations dates as effectively in limbo where discrimination continues to occur beyond the first event.
I have not had to make submissions for a complainant in a situation quite like this one, but if I did I would probably argue that the termination notice and the termination itself were akin to separate and/or continuing acts of discrimination. Put another way, telling someone you are going to discriminate against them and then actually following through with it should both be considered distinct acts of discrimination with fresh limitations dates. The second event clearly has a discriminatory effect as well, but I think its extremely harsh to interpret the second event as merely an effect.
However, this decision is clear and it says what it says. It is clearly a win for employers.
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This blog post is an original work of Bow River Law LLP. The original publish of this article is on Bow River Law’s website blog.
